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1 Introduction
1
Stephen Breyer, a judge of the US Supreme Court, wrote 
some fifteen years ago: »Scientific issues permeate the law (…). 
The law must seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of 
scientifically sound knowledge and approximately reflect the 
scientific state of the art (…). I believe that in this age of science 
we must build legal foundations that are sound in science as well 
as in law. Scientists have offered their help. We in the legal com-
munity should accept that offer, and we are in the process of do-
ing so. The result, in my view, will further not only the interests 
of truth but also those of justice.« (Breyer, 1998: 537−538) 
On 28 June, 1993 the Supreme Court of the United States 
issued a judgment which has revolutionised the perception 
of scientific evidence throughout the world. Naturally, this 
judgment affects both the judicature and the forensic science 
community. Although the ruling in question concerned a civ-
il case (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993), 
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this precedent has paradoxically played a most important role 
in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the 
appealed verdict and sent the case for a renewed hearing by 
the Court of Appeals for the 9th District. This court, taking 
into account over 30 epidemiological studies carried out on 
upwards of 130,000 persons, and guided by directives of the 
Supreme Court, dismissed the action in January 1995. On 2 
October 1995, the Supreme Court rejected a motion by plain-
tiffs for a renewed hearing of the case.
However, it is not of the slightest significance who won in 
this case, the plaintiff or the defendant; it is important what 
the »nine just men« ruled on assessment criteria of scientific 
evidence.
The Supreme Court determined that in Federal Courts, 
the hitherto Frye standard, of general acceptance in a given 
field of knowledge (see Frye v. United States, 1923), would be 
replaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence. When assessing ev-
idence, the adjudicating court should, in particular, be guided 
by the following criteria: falsification, review and publication, 
diagnostic value, standardisation, general acceptance.
The Court more precisely defined its standpoint in succes-
sive rulings, Electric Company v. Joiner (1997) and Kumho Tire 
Company Ltd. v. Carmichael (1999), reaching the conclusion 
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that according to Daubert criteria, applied flexibly, not only 
should the scientific evidence and methodology of research be 
evaluated, but also the conclusions of expert opinions. 
The Daubert standards have not been formally adopted 
either in state courts or in federal courts of the District of 
Columbia; in particular in the latter, the Frye standard of 
»general acceptance in a given field«, which was established 
there in 1923, has dominated since that date. However, by 
mid-2004 as many as 41 states had accepted evidence rules 
based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. The departure of the 
courts from the traditional procedure for assessing admissi-
bility of evidence in the form of a pre-trial hearing in the con-
text of Frye or Daubert criteria on testing the evidence reli-
ability in the trial itself through cross-examination can also be 
observed (Keierleber & Bohan, 2005). However, the opinion 
that »the Daubert test remains problematic and controversial 
because of the burden it puts on judges, not trained for this 
task, to make judgments about the scientific validity of evi-
dence« can also be encountered (Wecht, 2005: 534). 
Nevertheless, forensic evidence plays a consistent and ro-
bust role in judicial proceedings (Peterson, Hickman, Strom, 
& Johnson, 2013).   
2  American judges’ opinions about the scienti-
fic evidence evaluation 
Irrespective of the trial evidence standards, the key issue 
remains as to how they are understood and applied in practice 
by judges in particular civil and criminal cases. This matter 
was the subject of a survey of 400 American state judges con-
ducted in 1998, i.e., 5 years after standards from the Daubert 
case had come into force (Gatowski et al., 2001)
Somewhat over one-half (205) of the respondents adju-
dicated in states observing the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
the Daubert standard, whilst the remainder (195) presided in 
states loyal to the Frye standard and its hybrids. In terms of fo-
rensic education of judges, 209 (52%) considered that they had 
been appropriately trained to assess scientific evidence, while 
the remainder were more pessimistic (realistic?) in this matter. 
However, in the period since finishing high school, as many 
as 85% had successfully completed courses in social studies, 
77%  in science, and 67% in biological sciences. Although over 
half of the respondents (63%) had received training in using 
various types of scientific evidence in trials, 96% admitted that 
they had no knowledge of scientific methodology.
Meanwhile, the first Daubert criterion falsification is 
drawn directly from the Popperian understanding of science. 
It is therefore not surprising that in spite of the fact that 88% 
of judges deemed this criterion to be useful when assessing 
the essence of scientific evidence (8% were of the opposite 
opinion), only 4% of respondents did really understand it. 
The criterion of diagnostic value (error rate) was similar, 
despite the fact that the vast majority of judges; 364 (91%) re-
garded it as useful (54% even »very useful«), only 16 persons 
(4%) fully understood it.    
It turned out that, among all of the Daubert criteria, only 
peer-reviewed publication and general acceptance did not, in 
principle, pose difficulties for judges as full understanding of 
these points was ascertained in 71% and 82% of those sur-
veyed respectively. It would be worthwhile to observe that 
judges from »pro-Daubert« states did not turn out to be in 
the least bit more expert on Daubert standards than their col-
leagues from »pro-Frye« states. 
Another survey was conducted among 380 judges in 
Florida presiding over criminal, civil, family and juvenile 
cases (Bull Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). 144 (38%) of the replies 
were received concerning a civil case on sexual harassment. 
It turned out that as many as 17% of respondents would ad-
mit worthless psychological evidence and the same number 
would admit valid evidence. It might be therefore inferred 
that (American?) judges would also accept poor evidence as 
valid in other fields of forensic science.
Dixon and Gill (2002), when studying federal civil cases, 
established that in the post-Daubert era judges tend to be 
more inclined to assess the reliability of evidence from an 
expert opinion, standards of admissibility of such evidence 
have been raised, and parties, when presenting or challeng-
ing given evidence, also consider changes in the standards of 
assessment of scientific evidence. However, in criminal cases, 
only criteria from the Federal Rules of Evidence correlated 
with evidence admissibility, and a more significant influence 
of Daubert criteria was observed in relation to the admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence (Groscup, Penrod, Studebaker, Huss, 
& O’Neil, 2002).
Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, and Bradshaw (2006) 
compared the knowledge of jurors (N = 111), criminal and civ-
il judges (N = 42) and policemen (N = 52), in comparison with 
that of 64 experts in the field of the psychology of eyewitness 
testimony. Responses of jurors matched those of experts only 
in 4 out of 30 statements (13%), the biggest difference (31% vs. 
81%) occurred in relation to a statement on diagnostic value 
of a simultaneous lineup (participants appear together in a 
line at the same time)  and a sequential lineup (the group of 
participants files past, but one by one): »Witnesses are more 
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likely to misidentify someone by making a relative judgment 
when presented with a simultaneous lineup (as opposed to a 
sequential lineup)«. Nota bene judges had even worse results 
here, i.e., 29%, and policemen 37%. Consistency was observed 
between judges and experts in relation to 40% of statements, 
with the greatest disparity being noted in the case of a thesis/
statement on hypnotic suggestibility, namely, 17% of judges vs. 
91% of experts. Police officers’ views were also consistent with 
those of experts in relation to 40% of statements.
Currently it is difficult to imagine a criminal trial without 
scientific evidence. Therefore a question whether judges are 
sufficiently prepared to evaluate evidence of this kind is quite 
reasonable, especially having in mind miscarriages of justice.
It seems that there are no delusions about the situation in 
the field. For example, Morgulis (2009: 277) writes: »There is 
reason to think that giving complex scientific questions to the 
judge may not yield better or less arbitrary results that letting 
the jury decide the issue.«
The authors of the noted American report on the status 
of forensic science define the forensic knowledge of judges in 
the following way: »Lawyers and judges often have insufficient 
training and background in scientific methodology, and they 
often fail to fully comprehend the approaches employed by 
different forensic science disciplines and the reliability of fo-
rensic science evidence that is offered in trial (…).« Judges 
»generally lack the scientific expertise necessary to compre-
hend and evaluate forensic evidence« (Strengthening forensic 
science in the United States, 2009: 27, 110). Thompson (2009) 
exaggerates, maintaining that the NRC report portrays judges 
as ignorant, co-dependent, and hidebound, nevertheless its 
conclusions and recommendations reflect the actual state of 
judges’ knowledge and abilities, not only in the United States.
3  Polish judges’ opinions about the scientific 
evidence evaluation
Art. 7 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure [C.C.P.] 
(1997) and Art. 233 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (1964) 
specify in the following way the judges’ duties on the free ap-
praisal of evidence: »The proceedings bodies shape their con-
viction on the basis of all evidence, evaluated freely according 
to the rules of proper reasoning and the indications of knowl-
edge and life experience,« and »The court evaluates the reliabil-
ity and strength of evidence according to its own conviction, on 
the basis of the comprehend evaluation of the evidence.«   
Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz and Wójcikiewicz (2009) sur-
veyed 148 Polish judges presiding in criminal trials: 87 (59%) 
from district courts, 57 (39%) from regional courts and 4 (2%) 
from appellate courts. Their average tenure was 10.2 years. 
When asked whether they were sufficiently prepared for the 
evaluation of scientific evidence, only 61 (41%) answered pos-
itively, 78 (53%) – negatively, and 9 persons (6%) did not give 
any answer. The answers to the question whether they had 
difficulties assessing expert witness opinions were as follows: 
very often – 0, often – 43 (29%), seldom – 103 (70%), never 
– 2 (1%). Paradoxically, 41 persons who maintained that they 
were not sufficiently prepared for evidence evaluation claimed 
they rarely had any difficulties in performing this task! 
Very similar results were obtained by Hrehorowicz (2011) 
from having surveyed 37 judges presiding in economic crimi-
nal trials: 24 (65%) judges admitted that they were not suf-
ficiently prepared for the evaluation of scientific evidence. 
Three (8%) respondents had very often difficulties in proceed-
ing with this task, 12 (32%) – often, 21 (57%) – seldom, and 
1 (3%) – never. 
Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz and Wójcikiewicz (2009) also 
inquired of the judges about the five most frequently ordered 
expert witness opinions in trials. Their ranking was as follows:
 
Psychiatric – 95% (140);
Road accident analysis – 88% (130);
Psychological – 76% (113); 
Handwriting and questioned documents – 68% (100);
Forensic medicine – 66% (98); 
Fingerprints – 53% (78);
Toxicological – 23% (34);
Tool marks – 21% (31);
Foot wear and tyre marks – 21% (31);
DNA – 16% (24);
Dog scent lineups – 11% (16);
Polygraph examination – 2% (3); 
Other – 3% (5). 
The respondents were also asked as to what kind of ex-
pert witness opinion used to be the most difficult to evaluate 
(range from 1 – very difficult to 13 – very easy). This time the 
order was (partially) reversed: 
Polygraph examination – 4,87;
Dog scent lineups – 4,93;
DNA – 5,13;
Road accident analysis – 5,19;
Toxicological – 6,48;
Psychiatric – 6,58;
Psychological – 6,80;
Tool marks – 6,82;
Foot wear and tyre marks  – 6,84;
Handwriting and questioned documents – 6,87;
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Forensic medicine – 7,25;
Fingerprints – 7,68. 
It seems that conclusive expert witness opinions are the 
easiest to evaluate, especially those referring to fingerprints, 
forensic medicine, and handwriting. As the most troublesome 
the respondents qualified vague, inconclusive or novel opin-
ions such as the ones based on the polygraph examination, 
dog scent lineups or DNA examinations. The frequency of the 
opinions in trials and the judges’ degree of familiarity with the 
issue also could have affected the answers.  
The respondents, when asked about the reasons of the 
above-mentioned troubles and difficulties, indicated sophis-
ticated methods and complicated technical language – 33% 
(49), ambiguity, unclear terminology of the opinions – 26% 
(38), and the lack of forensic knowledge – 26% (38). 
De Keijser and Elffers (2012) examined the understanding 
of likelihood ratios by Dutch judges (N = 118), and defence 
counsels (N = 69) comparing to forensic science experts (N 
= 98). They came to the conclusion that proper understand-
ing of likelihood ratios by jurists is quite poor, which is due 
mainly to the prosecutor’s fallacy. 
4  Judges’ knowledge on eyewitness testimony
Relatively many surveys deal with the problem of the 
respondents’ knowledge on eyewitness testimony. Judges’ 
knowledge should, however, be analysed in the context of 
psychologists’ knowledge, at least Norwegian 857 licensed 
psychologists, who had completed courses in cognitive psy-
chology and memory science surveyed by Magnussen and 
Melinder (2012: 58), »do not score higher than trial judges 
on memory issues specifically concerned with the reliability 
of eyewitness testimony, and they do not score higher than 
the average adult Norwegian citizen on more general issues 
of memory«. 
The series of such surveys of judges’ knowledge and be-
liefs was commenced by Wise and Safer (2004), who surveyed 
142 state judges, 10 federal judges, 7 retired judges, and one 
Indian tribal judge. The judges appear to have limited under-
standing of eyewitness factors as they averaged only about 
55% correct on the 14-item scale. 
The nearly identical questionnaire was presented to 121 
undergraduates and 57 second-and third-year law students. 
They answered correctly on 58% and 66% items, respectively. 
It turned out that U.S. judges were no more knowledgeable 
than undergraduates about factors affecting the accuracy of 
eyewitness testimony, and that both groups were less knowl-
edgeable than law students were!
The results of the American judges (55%) were also 
compared with the results of 157 Norwegian judges – 63% 
(Magnussen et al., 2008) and the results of 170 Chinese judges 
– 47% (Wise, Gong, Safer & Lee, 2010).
Magnussen, Melinder, Strindbeck, and Raja (2010) com-
pared the results of Norwegian judges (63%) to the results of 
168 Norwegian jurors (58%), and 1,000 Norwegian citizens 
(56%). However, the best respondents were American defence 
attorneys whose knowledge score was 78%, well above the 
scores of the judges (Wise, Pawlenko, Meyer & Safer, 2007)!  
5  The remedies for optimising judges’ asses-
sment of scientific evidence 
As experts in law, judges cannot also be efficient arbiters 
of all kinds of science or skill experts (Shaw, 2011). What rem-
edies should be implemented then into the criminal justice 
system to achieve the main goal of criminal trials: to detect 
and adequately punish the perpetrator, and not to convict the 
innocent person? It seems that those remedies are as follows:
•	 Court-appointed experts,
•	 Metaopinions,
•	 Expert opinions on eyewitness identification,
•	 Education of judges on forensic sciences.
Court-appointed experts (c.f., Hillman, 2002) can and 
should provide help for the court not only in the common law 
system. The report Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings 
in England and Wales (2011), issued by the Law Commission, 
contains important recommendations in the field: »6.78. A 
judge should be provided with a statutory power to appoint 
an independent expert to assist him or her when determin-
ing whether a party’s proffered expert opinion evidence is 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted [since] 8.8. Judges do not 
need to be trained to become scientists, they merely need to 
be trained to be critical consumers of the science that comes 
before them.« Paradoxically, the Bill of amendment of the 
Polish Code of Criminal Procedure (2013) strictly limits in 
Art. 167 § 1 the court’s right to produce evidence including 
calling up expert witnesses (»only in exceptional, particularly 
reasonable cases«). On the other hand, private opinions pre-
sented in court by the accused would be admissible (Art. 393 
§ 3), which nota bene will pose another challenge for judges.
The Polish Supreme Court in the judgment of 8 February 
2007, III K 277/06, LEX no. 257859, in the following way per-
ceives the judges’ duties concerning forensic expert witness 
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opinions: »The opinion of an expert is subject to free appraisal of 
evidence, just as any other piece of evidence, in accordance with 
requirements specified  in Art. 7 of the C.C.P. This assessment 
can concern every aspect of the issued opinion, which means 
that it does not have to be limited exclusively to the analysis 
of logical correctness of experts’ conclusions, but should also 
concern the scientific correctness of the statements applied.« 
No doubt judges can sometimes have problems with adequate 
assessment of some scientific evidence. It is difficult to demand 
of judges that they have up-to-date knowledge on research 
methodology and scientific achievements. Metaopinions, i.e. 
opinions about opinions, without any additional examinations, 
seem to be a good way to obtain more knowledge in the situ-
ation of a judge’s deficit of information (Wójcikiewicz, 2009). 
 
Metaopinions are admissible in Polish judicial proceed-
ings.  For example, the Supreme Court in its judgment of 28 
July 2005, V KK 18/05 (unpublished) stated that: »The court 
should consider the need to prepare a metaopinion (as evi-
dence) by an appropriate institute, with the aim of assessing 
the correctness of the expert analysis performed in the case.  
Admittedly, an expert in the field of osmology should in prin-
ciple be appointed to carry out an appropriate expert analysis 
of scent traces with the help of specialists. Nevertheless in a 
situation, where an osmological opinion constitutes the only 
incriminating evidence and doubts exist as to the method-
ological correctness of conducting the osmological expert 
analysis (this dynamically developing field of knowledge still 
does not guarantee explicit diagnostic results), it is possible to 
admit evidence from a metaopinion to assess the correctness 
of the expert opinion already provided in the case.« However, 
metaopinions ought to be treated as exceptional, and should 
not be regarded as a remedy for judges’ ignorance. 
The admissibility of a court expert evaluating the diag-
nostic value of the eyewitness identification evidence is still 
questionable, at least in common law countries (cf. Elliott, 
1993; Fradella, 2006). However, this expert can support the 
court with a plethora of information unattainable from other 
sources. The illusion of the judges or the jury members being 
competent enough to assess the probative value of eyewitness 
testimony has led many innocent persons even to death row. 
Calling up an expert witness to evaluate an eyewitness iden-
tification testimony (the identification parade) by using the 
mock witness paradigm, undoubtedly could prevent many 
miscarriages of justice: out of the first 250 ex-prisoners exon-
erated owing to the Innocence Project, as many as 190 (76%) 
were misidentified by the witnesses (Garrett, 2011). Wise, 
Dauphinais, and Safer (2007) treat expert witness opinions 
in such cases as protective mechanisms against witness mis-
identification, next to strict compliance with the most recent 
and improved identification procedures and educating law-
yers and police officers. In some Polish cases such an expert 
witness opinion led even to the acquittal (Wójcikiewicz & 
Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz, 2011).  
It is a truism that forensic science education and train-
ing of prospective and current judges as well as prosecutors, 
defence counsel, and police officers is vital for the healthy 
criminal justice system. Especially judges are situated in a 
rather embarrassing position being obliged to evaluate sci-
entific evidence (expert witness opinions) not having enough 
knowledge to carry out their duties. Therefore all forms of 
forensic science education and training of lawyers and pro-
spective lawyers (students and apprentices) should be highly 
appreciated. For instance, the Department of Criminalistics 
and Public Security of the Jagiellonian University has been or-
ganising since 2007, the one-year postgraduate studies on evi-
dence law and forensic sciences. Out of 532 students at least 
as many as 218 public prosecutors, 143 judges and 18 police 
officers graduated by 2013.    
6  Conclusions
No doubt the proper evaluation of evidence is the best 
protection against the miscarriages of justice. It seems that 
the problem of the competencies of judges concerning scien-
tific evidence evaluation will become more prominent when 
taking into consideration the changing paradigm of forensic 
science. Although the judges obviously prefer the conclusive 
expert witness opinions, they probably will have to be accus-
tomed, and not only in forensic genetics, to the inconclusive 
opinions, mostly interpreted in line with the Bayes theorem 
(Konieczny, 2012; Saks & Koehler, 2005, 2008). From this per-
spective even more important become all training and educa-
tion programmes targeted at the scientific evidence evaluators. 
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Odnos sodnikov do znanstvenih dokazov
Józef Wójcikiewicz, dipl. pravnik, doktor pravnih znanosti, redni profesor za kriminalistiko 
na Jagelonski univerzi v Krakovu, Poljska. E-pošta: jozef.wojcikiewicz@uj.edu.pl  
Članek obravnava stanje znanja sodnikov o forenzični znanosti in njihovo sposobnost za ocenjevanje znanstvenih dokazov. 
Predstavljeni so rezultati raziskav, izvedenih v različnih državah, ki so primerjali znanje o forenziki med sodniki, zagovorniki, porotniki, 
študenti in občani. Študija se osredotoča na raziskavo o poljskih sodnikih, ki je potekala leta 2009. Ugotovitve so pesimistične; veliko 
sodnikov nima ustreznega in zadostnega znanja za ocenjevanje znanstvenih dokazov. Enake so ugotovitve glede njihovega znanja o 
pričanju očividca. V različnih državah bi bilo treba izvesti nadaljnje raziskave na drugih populacijah sodnikov. Študija predstavlja 
izčrpno primerjavo rezultatov raziskave pri vprašanjih, ki se nanašajo na sodnike, zaradi česar bi le-ti morali prepoznati potrebo po 
povečanju njihovega znanja o forenziki. Nadzorniki kazenskega pravosodja bi morali ustvariti ustrezne programe izobraževanja in 
usposabljanja, namenjene izključno sodnikom. Avtorji predlagajo določena pravna sredstva za izboljšanje odgovornosti sodnikov: od 
sodišča imenovani strokovnjaki, meta-mnenja, strokovnjaki za identifikacijo očividca kot tudi izobraževanje in usposabljanje sodnikov 
na področju forenzike.
Ključne besede: ocena znanstvenih dokazov, znanje sodnikov, očividci, pričanje
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